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Statues, History, and Identity: How Bad Public History Statues Wrong  
 
Abstract 
There has recently been a focus on the question of statue removalism. This concerns what 
to do with public history statues that honour or otherwise celebrate ethically bad historical 
figures. The specific wrongs of these statues have been understood in terms of derogatory 
speech, inapt honours, or supporting bad ideologies. In this paper I understand these bad 
public history statues as history, and identify a distinctive class of public history-specific 
wrongs. Specifically, public history plays an important identity-shaping role, and bad public 
history can commit specifically ontic injustice. Understanding bad public history in terms of 
ontic injustice helps understand not just to address bad public history statues, but also 
understand the value of public history more broadly. 
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Philosophy is beginning to catch up with the popular debate on public history statues. In 
2017, Joanna Burch-Brown published a paper on what is now called the question of 
removalism: should statues of and monuments to historically bad figures be removed? Since 
then, the philosophical literature has developed including prominent contributions from 
Helen Frowe (2019), Johannes Schulz (2019), Chung-Min Lim (2020), Ten-Herng Lai (2020), 
and Burch-Brown again (forthcoming). These papers represent a consensus that statues of 
morally bad historical figures (sometimes called “tainted commemorations”) ought to be 
removed, or at least recontextualized. Recontextualization in particular emerges as a way to 
satisfy both removalist and preservationist demands. 
 
What I wish to do in this paper is highlight and discuss an oversight ubiquitous to the 
existing literature, which is that it does not give sufficient weight to the fact that these 
historical monuments are, well, historical monuments. This is to say that there is a lack of 
appreciation of the role of history in these monuments, and consequently a lack of 
appreciation of the role the monuments play as public history. This results in missing what is 
distinctive about these public history monuments, which in turn results in misunderstanding 
a prominent form of preservationism and overestimating the conciliatory appeal of the 
popular solution of recontextualization. 
 
1 Special thanks are owed to James Humphries, James Rimmer, Alfred Archer, Nathan Wildman, and J Phillipp 
Dapprich. This paper was completed under funding from the Society for Applied Philosophy. 
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My argument proceeds across four sections. First, §2 provides a brief overview of the 
current literature, including the main understandings of the wrongs of bad public history 
statues and how those are taken to support the approach of recontextualization. In §3 and 4 
I provide my account of bad public history statues. §3 details how public history can work to 
create and shape public identities, and §4 extends this account to show how bad public 
history statues can create a distinct, history-centred class of wrongs. In §5 I show a further 
explanatory value of centring history: understanding the importance of history — and public 
history specifically — in shaping public identity elucidates the value of public history.  
 
2. An Overview 
 
Arguments concerning removalism may be sorted into one of two categories. First, there 
are arguments that establish the badness of a public history statue. These seek to establish 
what are the features of a public history monument that could merit its removal. The 
features in question determine that, in some way, the statue is causing or perpetuating a 
moral wrong. Second, there are arguments about what to do with statues which are 
candidates for removal, about when to opt to keep the statues (preservationism), remove 
them (removalism), or attempt a recontextualization. I address the two categories in turn. 
 
One strategy for establishing the badness of monuments is to argue that the monuments 
are in some way harmful. The simplest form of the argument is just that a public history 
statue is psychologically harmful (Timmerman 2020: 514-515) or an “offensive reminder” of 
unpalatable history (Demetriou and Wingo 2018: 344). More sophisticated variants focus on 
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monuments’ ability to “degrade” and “alienate” people (Schulz 2019: 167). Examples, of 
degradation or alienation include stabilizing unjust power relations (Burch-Brown 2017: 69), 
undermining recognition respect (Schulz 2019: 169), expressing contempt for members of 
the public (Bell 2018), or promoting incorrect self-understandings (Burch-Brown 2017: 68; 
Tanesini 2018). Altogether, this class of reasons holds that bad public history statues have a 
certain set of negative social effects centring on degradation and alienation, and this makes 
those statues candidates for removal. 
 
Another way of establishing the badness of monuments is to argue that a monument is in 
some way inapt. These arguments centre on the idea that monuments honour their subjects 
but the subject of some particular statue ought not to be honoured. Examples include 
Burch-Brown’s argument that some statues promote a set of public meanings related to 
identity and authority promote honouring, identifying with, granting authority to, or 
centring a community on a subject who has committed a grave injustice (Burch-Brown 2017: 
68). The subject having committed a grave injustice makes them inapt for these roles or 
attitudes, and so the statue should be a candidate for removal. Frowe (2019) presents a 
similar argument, holding that public history statues necessarily positively evaluate their 
subjects, and if this positive evaluation is inapt, the statues ought to be removed.2  
 
If a statue is a candidate for removal, what should be done with it? Preservationism involves 
keeping the monuments in place and unchanged, though most of the debate has been on 
 
2 We might also mention the comedy television series Rutherford Falls, where the statue of Big Larry is 
targeted for removal because it’s a traffic hazard.  
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the question of removalism versus recontextualization.3 For the purposes of this paper, I 
take “recontextualization” to cover all options which leave the statue in place while altering 
either features of the statue or the statue’s surroundings. Recontextualization is seen as 
carrying two main benefits over removalism. The first is that by keeping the physical statue 
in place, it satisfies preservationist preferences that the statue continue to allow access to 
the past and, in the case of bad public history statues, an opportunity to learn from it (Lim 
2020: 194, 198; Burch-Brown (forthcoming). The second benefit of recontextualization is 
that it allows a more direct confrontation with the badness represented in the statue. 
Recontextualizations may make the statue a focus of active contempt (Bell 2018: 13), or use 
vandalism as counter speech to confront the badness of the statue Lai (2020: 604). The two 
arguments for recontextualization do not apply in every case — the authors acknowledge 
that there will be cases where outright removal is still preferable — but they present the 
argument that significant good can be gained by recontextualizing rather than outright 
removing bad public history statues. 
 
3. The Role of History 
 
While the articles surveyed provide compelling cases for removing or recontextualizing 
public history statues, they face a significant problem. Specifically, they do not address 
public history statues as history. This has two consequences. The first is that the arguments 
apply to public art in general but do little to address the concerns which are specific to the 
statues being works of history. This means that their analyses miss a class of wrongs which 
 
3 Dan Demetriou offers a limited defence of preservationism on the grounds of “tribal continuity” and civic 
cohesion (2019).   
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are particular to the statues as history. The second, related consequence is that by virtue of 
not addressing the statues as history, the value of recontextualization is overstated. In fact, 
if the statues are properly understood as history, what has been presented as 
recontextualization is just another form of removal. Supporting these claims requires 
providing an account of how to understand public history statues as history, which I do 
presently. This account has two main parts. The first is a short discussion of what it means 
to say that these statues are public history. The second explicates the role public history 
plays in shaping public identity. 
 
History is not just the sum total of past events. Rather, it is an active process of 
reconstructing a particular vision of the past (Gordon 2001, xv). This involves not merely 
detailing these past events, but offering a way to understand them and their relationship to 
each other. Not just that something happened, but how and why it did. Public history is the 
history that is available in public spaces and is accessible by members of the public. 
Paradigmatic public history includes historical plaques, which describe some significant 
event or person associated with the location, and public history statues, which visually 
represent a significant person or event from the past (Gordon 2001, 7). Note that the 
statues do not merely represent a historical past. By being part of the process of 
reconstructing a vision of past events, the statues are history in their own rights.   
 
Public history, as works of history, offer reconstructions of past events. That history 
provides particular perspectives on past events means that different works of history can 
present different perspectives of the same event. Importantly, this can mean evincing 
different attitudes. Consider the recently-erected statue of John A. Macdonald in Picton, 
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Ontario.4 The statue represents a scene of Macdonald in a courtroom from 1834. It is his 
first time in court, and the statue presents this as the beginning of his legal career. The 
vision of history that the statue represents is that this is an important beginning for 
Macdonald’s career as lawyer and statesman, giving Picton a claim to having played a 
foundational role in the foundation and shaping of Canada. In foregrounding Macdonald’s 
role as lawyer and statesman, the statue evinces a positive attitude towards him. However, 
the statue offers no indication of why Macdonald was in court. This is perhaps because his 
appearance was a result of him, the night before, having been arrested for being drunk in 
public. One could imagine a similar statue to the Picton statue, depicting the same events 
but foregrounding this fact. It could have even foregrounded his role as lawyer and 
statesman, but evinced a much more negative attitude: this was not the start of a glorious 
career but a tragic one. Macdonald was a notorious alcoholic5 and so an arrest for 
drunkenness could mark the beginning of a career marked by selfishness and disregard for 
others. Recognizing the Picton Macdonald statue as a work of history, then, requires 
recognizing that it presents a particular vision of past events and evinces an attitude 
towards them. 
 
That the Macdonald statue centres Macdonald’s role as a statesman and nation-builder 
indicates the importance of public history in shaping public identity. At the simplest level, 
the statue defines Picton as a place that is important in the history of Canada. However, 
 
4 Since the writing of this paper, the statue was recommended for removal by an expert panel, that panel’s 
recommendations were rejected by the municipal council, and then the statue was finally removed following 
the discovery of an unmarked mass grave outside of a former residential school in Kamloops, British Columbia 
(Peddigrew 2021). 
5 Shortly after moving to Kingston, Ontario, as a youth I was told a legend about Macdonald who, having been 
banned from every bar in the capitol for his drunkenness, bought his own and took out a wall so he could ride 
up to the bar rail in his horse and carriage. 
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public history plays a further important role in shaping public identity. Some identities are 
defined, at least in part, by history. These are communal identities which persist across 
time, and so historical events are used to demarcate these identities’ boundaries. To be 
Canadian, for example, involves standing in a certain relation to particular historical events 
like the British North America Act of 1867 or the Summit Series of 1972.  
 
Public history plays an essential role in taking these identity-defining historical events and 
making them applicable to the public. The statues do not just represent a piece of a 
historical narrative, they do so at a particular location. The public history statue is situated 
at a public location — often somewhere important like a government building or town 
square — which creates a connection between the history and that location. The history is 
relevant to the location, and the location to the history. The history then shapes the identity 
of the people who inhabit or frequent that location. Note that the statue can have multiple 
relationships to the territory in which it finds itself. The Picton Macdonald statue is relevant 
both to Picton as something distinct from the rest of Canada and Picton as it is part of 
Canada. It helps to define both Picton and the broader Canadian identity by representing a 
history that makes Picton a location of a Canada-defining event.  
 
The publicness of public history serves to create public memory. Memory, in this sense, is 
not analogical to individual biological memory but rather refers to what persists across time 
and is transmitted across generations (Nora 1989: 8).6 Public history statues tend to be 
made of quite solid stuff and so the statues, as physical objects, persist. Such that the 
 
6 Understanding memory in this way draws back to the work of Maurice Halbwachs. 
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statues represent histories, those histories are transmitted across generations. Such that 
those histories help constitute identities, the statues play a role in transmitting identity 
across generations. As Pierre Nora notes, public history comes to play an outsized role in 
public memory — and thereby public identity — as other continuities with the past are 
severed (1989: 12). As social change disrupts forms of living and technological changes alter 
urban landscapes, the self-consciously created public history becomes the main way of 
establishing continuity across time (Nora op cit; Connerton 2015). Accordingly, public 
history statues play an important role in creating and preserving a public identity that 
persists across time.7 
 
My account of public history statues puts me in tension with Frowe’s (2019) argument that 
there are many statues that are blunt honourifics, not seriously concerned with history.8 Her 
argument is twofold. Her first point is that, since putatively historical statues 
underrepresent women and overrepresent men, these statues do not form a representative 
historical record and therefore should not be treated as works of history. The second point 
is that while some statues may include historical detail, many statues are simply blunt 
objects which offer nothing but a prescription to honour and admire the statue’s subject. 
Together, these points form a challenge to my account which holds that public history 
statues are works of history. 
 
 
7 While I have focused on public history statues, it is worth noting that not all pubic statues are historical. 
Some are mythological, or purely artistic. While my argument does not apply exactly to these cases, I believe 
my account of the connection between statue, location and public is still informative. I thank an anonymous 
reviewer for suggesting I address this. 
8 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting I address this. 
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I offer three points in response. The first is that there are some works which are simply 
blunt honourifics, and for those I may defer to Frowe at no cost. I can accept that blunt 
honourifics are simply not works of history, and thus beyond the concern of this paper. The 
second is that Frowe’s first point about the non-representativeness of statues does not, 
unfortunately, render public statuary outside the regular practice of history, both popular 
and academic. While many people are taking steps to repair the elision of women, racialized 
people, and other subaltern people from the corpus of history, the fact is that history as 
practiced has focused on the stories of well-to-do white, male, nationalistic figures. Public 
statues’ non-representativeness, then, does not disqualify these statues from being works 
of history. Lastly, Frowe’s challenge of bluntness can be addressed by noting that even the 
most basic statues have some historical content. Consider the statue of Jack Miner outside 
of the police station in Kingsville, Ontario. A masculine figure poses with his right hand on a 
goose and a left hand in the air. Plaques on the statue’s base inform that this is a statue of 
Jack Miner, his birth and death dates, and the parties that funded the statue’s erection. 
There is nothing to suggest who Miner was, or why he was significant. Nevertheless, some 
slight historical detail can be extracted. Specifically, the location of the statue suggests 
Miner’s importance to Kingsville. “Jack Miner lived in Kingsville and had some significance to 
how Kingsville is today” is a very slight history, but it is a history. The combination of figure 
and location present a narrative that is barely there, but is in fact there. 
 
In this section, I have shown that public history statues play an important role in creating 
and sustaining a public identity. These statues represent histories which shape identities. By 
virtue of their public location, these statues shape the identity of the public of that location. 
The permanency of the statues serves to create public memory, by which the history and 
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history-shaped identity are transmitted across generations. Altogether, this means that 
understanding statues as public history allows identifying a distinctive class of wrongs 
particular to public history. These are wrongs particular to public history’s identity-creating 
and identity-sustaining functions. 
 
4. The Wrongs of Bad History 
 
In the previous section, I made the claims that the existing literature on bad public history 
statues missed an important class of wrongs, and that understanding public history statues 
as history allows identifying a distinctive class of wrongs particular to public history. In this 
section, I elaborate and defend those claims. Specifically, I argue that in the case of public 
history there are a class of wrongs particular to the creation and sustenance of identity. 
These wrongs are specifically ontic injustices, harms related to how people are categorized. I 
show that the concept of ontic injustice helps not only helps one to understand the identity-
centred wrongs of bad history, but also helps to clarify, organize, and refine the wrongs 
identified by the consensus views. I conclude the section by showing that when accounting 
for ontic injustice, recontextualization approaches effectively reduce to either removalism 
or preservationism. 
 
Public history helps create and sustain identities. These identities are categories which 
include or exclude certain people. Such that public history statues tie an identity to a 
location, these statues may include or exclude the people who live at such a location from 
the identity category that that statue shapes. Consider Christopher Columbus statues of the 
sort that are located around the United States. Many of these statues represent Columbus 
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as a discoverer of the Americas, and so may be considered as representing a history which 
presents Columbus as the discoverer of the Americas. There is a problem with this history: 
the Americas were populated by the time Columbus landed at Guanahani. Presenting 
Columbus as a “discoverer,” then, sustains a public identity which excludes or otherwise 
marginalizes Indigenous peoples.9 Similarly, much Nova Scotian public history focuses on 
Scots and Norse history, while eliding Black or Indigenous history (McKay and Bates 2010: 
11). This shapes a Nova Scotian identity that is overstatedly Scots and Norse, and 
marginalizes Black and Indigenous people. As Ian McKay and Robin Bates note: this sort of 
historical inclusion and exclusion is far from anodyne. Public history is overwhelmingly 
interested in “firsts” — first discoverers, first settlers, first achievers. These firsts create a 
Lockean claim on the territory: the Scots or Norse settlers are presented as the first to mix 
their labour with the Nova Scotian land, and are thereby granted legitimate ownership 
(McKay and Bates 328). 
 
The Columbus and Nova Scotia examples show that not only can public history exclude and 
marginalize, it can exclude and marginalize wrongfully. There are two ways of 
understanding this wrongness. The first is that the identity category is shaped in such a way 
that it wrongs particular people. The second is that the category itself may be considered 
wrong. To elucidate these wrongs, I appeal to Katherine Jenkins’s concept of ontic injustice. 
She defines ontic injustice as follows: 
An individual suffers an ontic injustice if and only if they are socially 
constructed as a member of a certain social kind where that construction 
 
9 Columbus statues present a particularly interesting case, such that many were erected in the early 20th 
century specifically to garner support of Italian Americans. The statues thereby work to specifically include 
Italian Americans as “Americans,” but at the cost of excluding Indigenous peoples. 
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consists, at least in part, of their being subjected to a set of social 
constraints and enablements that is wrongful to them. (2020: 191) 
To say that a social kind consists in being subject to a set of social constraints is to say that 
part of what makes that kind that kind is that members of that kind are either constrained 
(treated or permitted to be treated in certain ways) or enabled (act or permitted to act in 
certain ways) based on their membership in that kind. Historically-informed identities are 
social kinds. Accordingly, to say that wrongful exclusion or marginalization is an ontic 
injustice is to say that public history creates or sustains a public identity that inflicts upon at 
least some people a wrongful set of constraints and enablements. 
 
Excluding people from membership in a historically-informed identity category can create a 
number of wrongful constraints. As Hobsbawm notes, nations are often considered the 
basic unit of a group entitled to political sovereignty (1990: 102; 163). Such that national 
identities are partially defined historically, a nation-defining history that excludes some 
group of people from that nation also excludes that group of people from that nation’s 
entitlement to their place in collective political self-determination. Consequently, someone 
who is wrongfully excluded from — or marginalized within — that group’s identity-defining 
history is wrongfully constrained with respect to their corresponding place in collective 
political self-determination. Following from McKay and Bates’ earlier point about public 
history grounding a Lockean claim on land ownership, wrongful exclusion may wrongfully 
constrain people with respect to the claim they have to inhabit particular territories. Put 
simply, group membership is about who matters, who matters more, and who matters less. 
Wrongfully considering someone to matter less is also a moral injury by virtue of failing to 
value that person as a member of a moral political community. Lastly, these wrongs are 
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directed towards particular people, but statues can also contribute to ontic injustice by 
creating wrongfully exclusionary groups. Such that the purpose of this paper is developing 
an understanding of what is distinctive about public history statues, and the distinctive ways 
that public history statues may be bad, it is a finesse worth keeping in mind. 
 
Appealing to ontic injustice helps underline the contrast between my position and those of 
other writers. Alienation, as Burch-Brown and Schulz identify, is a distinctly psychological 
phenomenon. It is centred on promoting incorrect self-understandings, (Burch-Brown 2017: 
68) or denying a source of self-respect (Schulz 2019: 167). These approaches focus on felt 
exclusion. The appeal to ontic injustice allows my account to present a much more 
substantive exclusion; bad public history statues alienate by constructing a wrongfully 
exclusionary historically-informed identity, and thereby wrongfully constrain people with 
respect to rights of political self-determination and claiming territory. Understanding 
alienation through ontic injustice and historically-defined groups also helps manage the 
important distinction between wrongful and not wrongful alienation. Someone committed 
to political membership limited by racist hierarchy may feel alienated by public history 
statues which incorporate anti-racist and anti-colonial figures into the public identity. For 
example, someone who defined their moral worth and political membership in terms of the 
greatness of the British Empire may feel alienated by the Louis Riel statue at the Manitoba 
provincial legislature. But the British colonial identity is one that granted wrongful 
enablements — of moral and political ‘mattering more’ granted by British racial identity 
— and so being denied those wrongful enablements is not being wrongfully constrained. 
Consequently, the Riel statue does not sustain a historically-informed identity that 
wrongfully alienates the British colonial. 
 15 
 
The appeal to ontic injustice can also speak to the relationship between bad public history 
statues and unjust power relations. What is at issue is not necessarily what the statues 
express; rather, these statues construct a whole identity by which some people matter 
more than others. These identities, in turn, legitimate the granting or denying of full moral 
and political membership, and consequently the power structures which develop from that 
membership. This allows a further response to the idea that what is wrong with bad public 
history statues is that they promote incorrect self-understanding, or otherwise mislead. 
Statues misleading is consistent with the history the statues represent being merely false. 
As my argument above has shown, the problem is not that the statues are wrong but that 
they are bad: they create or sustain unjust identities. 
 
Lastly, engaging public history statues specifically as public history shows a shortcoming in 
the arguments that hold that the wrong of bad public history statues is that the subjects are 
inapt for honour. The identity-shaping role of public history statues does not appeal to the 
goodness of the statue’s subject. To the extent that the statue’s subject is chosen for 
reasons other than the subject’s goodness or honorability, the argument that the subject is 
inapt to be honored is not very forceful.10 Rather, addressing public history statues as 
history requires engaging the sort of historically-informed identity the statue helps shape. 
 
So what does my argument mean for proposed solutions to the question of bad public 
history statues? I contend that if what is at stake is the identity shaped by the public history 
 
10 This is a useful way to understand the “erasing history” objection (Abrahams, forthcoming). 
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statue, then the proposed solutions concern either preserving or removing the history that 
so-shapes the identity. The main consequence of this position is that recontextualization 
dissolves into either removalism or preservationism. If the recontextualization is strong 
enough to eliminate or change the statue’s role in sustaining the identity it was shaping, 
then this is equivalent to removal since it is undoing the statue’s identity-sustaining 
function. If the recontextualization is not strong enough to eliminate or change the statue’s 
role in sustaining the identity it was shaping, then this is equivalent to preservation since it 
is preserving the statue’s identity-sustaining function. Put simply, either an intervention 
changes who the statue presents as mattering or it does not. Unfortunately for the view 
that recontextualization presents a good compromise between removalists and 
preservationists, preservationists committed to preserving the statue-shaped identity would 
not be satisfied just because the literal material of the statue remained; like a work of art, it 
is not the rock that is valuable but what that rock achieves. And to the committed 
removalist, an intervention that does not undermine a statue’s shaping of an unjust identity 




I now examine two cases for the purpose of supporting my argument. They are the 
decapitation (and alternate-world theft) of the Egerton Ryerson statue in Toronto, and a 
proposed the modification to Nazi-era soldiers’ memorial in Düsseldorf. They are used as 
examples of putative recontextualizations which keep the physical stuff of the original 




This summer statue of Egerton Ryerson, one of the architects of Canada’s Residential 
Schools system, was toppled and decapitated outside of the Toronto university which holds 
his name.11 The statue was decapitated, and its head was twice relocated: first to 1492 Land 
Back Lane and then to a Mohawk institute named The Mush Hole, located in a former 
Residential School (Morritt-Jacobs and McDougall, 2021). This is a very blunt 
recontextualization, but it serves as a good jumping off point to examine the connection 
between the statue’s material, its location, and its identity-sustaining function. Ryerson’s 
head on a stick on unceded territory is evocative: it turns the statue from one representing 
a colonial history (in the model of Canada’s British-derived, colony-to-nation national 
narrative) to one representing that history’s repudiation.12 It is not just Ryerson that fell, but 
the land that Ryerson held (by virtue of his place in Canada’s nation-defining history) has 
been stripped from underneath him. At The Mush Hole, Ryerson’s head gives a history of 
the defeat of the Residential Schools system that he helped bring about. 
 
Imagine now a similar case where the Ryerson statue, instead of being decapitated, had 
been taken in its entirety, plinth and all, and been relocated to Land Back Lane and then The 
Mush Hole. In this case, the literal material of the statue has been fully preserved, but I 
argue its identity-sustaining function is still undermined. My account of public history has 
given a significant role to the connection between statue and territory, and the move of the 
Ryerson statue from a downtown Toronto institution bearing Ryerson’s name to unceded 
 
11 At time of writing, the university’s board has announced its intention to rename but not what that new 
name will be. 
12 Perhaps significantly, despite the territory of Land Back Lane being unceded and sovereign, Canadian 
property developers have bulldozed some of it in an attempt to build cottages and other vacation homes.  
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land is significant. The connection between Ryerson and Canada’s metropole is severed. 
Outside The Mush Hole, the identity that the Ryerson statue supports is of one that 
triumphed over Canada: here is who used to rule, here is who was defeated. 
 
The full Ryerson relocation case is somewhat similar to statue solutions which relocated 
statues to museums. However, the Ryerson case can be tweaked again to keep a tighter 
connection between the statue and the territory it initially inhabited. Imagine if, instead of 
the full statue being relocated, it was still at its original location. However, in this case, 
Skyler Williams is hoisting the statue above her head. In such a case the material of the 
statue is intact, and it is still at its original location in downtown Toronto. However, the 
identity-sustaining function is still undermined. The disruption at least partially severs the 
connection between the statue and the territory. Importantly, by the statue being held aloft 
by a person who rejects its authority, the statue’s claim over the territory is undermined; 
rather, the statue’s placement is now shown to be entirely contingent and at the mercy of 
people who reject it. Importantly, this means that this is no longer Ryerson’s public. If this is 
not Ryerson’s public, then Ryerson’s claim on the public identity is undone. 
 
Even in this last, hypothetical, Ryerson case there is still some measure of destruction as the 
statue is held aloft from the ground. To examine a case where the original public history is 
left entirely in place I turn to the proposed work “The Who Have Crossed.” TWHC is a 
proposed addition to a 1939 Nazi-era soldiers’ memorial in Düsseldorf. The original 
memorial is designated a protected historical structure, so any proposed alteration must 
leave that original structure intact. The goal, according to the city council, is to undermine 
and eliminate the original memorial’s claim on the public space of Reeser Platz (Düsseldorf – 
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39er Denkmal Reeser Platz). The proposed addition is a steel-plated bridge, beginning on a 
hill well behind the original monument, and continuing overtop the monument. This bridge 
achieves the alteration of the memorial’s claim on Reeser Platz in three ways. The first is 
that it allows a connection between the green space on one side of Reeser Platz with the 
cityscape of the other side which completely bypasses the soldiers’ monument. This creates 
a sense of public space over which the soldiers’ monument has no claim. As the proposal 
puts it, this dissolves the materiality of the monument.13 The second is that the bridge both 
precedes and exceeds the original monument, so the bridge is what onlookers will 
experience first. This allows the bridge to dominate the soldiers’ monument, and thereby 
have priority in determining the public space. The third way that TWHC alters the soldiers’ 
monument is that, by passing over the monument, it recasts where the past expressed by 
the soldiers’ monument in historical narrative. The war dead are recast as victims of 
German militarism, the role in German history not as glorious creators of the modern 
Germany but rather people who were sacrificed at the altar of nationalism and militarism. 
Altogether, despite the literal substance of the soldiers’ memorial being untouched, the 
bridge completely alters (and undermines) the memorial’s role in sustaining public identity. 
To the extent that the preservationist is motivated by the desire to preserve the soldiers’ 
memorial as a work of history — as something that fosters, shapes, and sustains a public 
identity — she finds no satisfaction in the fact that the soldiers’ memorial is technically 




13 “Ihre Materialität wird zugunsten einer Leichtigkeit aufgelöst.” (Düsseldorf – 39er Reeser Platz) 
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Altogether, in this section I have articulated and defended the claim that bad public history 
statues present a distinctive class of wrongs particular to these statues being public history. 
By virtue of history’s role in shaping historically-informed identities, these statues work to 
shape identities which unjustly marginalize and exclude people. This wrongful exclusion may 
be understood as a sort of ontic injustice, whereby the bad historically-informed identities 
generate wrongful constraints for the marginalized and excluded. These constraints involve 
a diminished or even eliminated entitlement to membership in the moral-political 
community and claims over territory. Understanding bad public history statues through the 
lens of ontic injustice helps organize, clarify, and refine the consensus account of the wrongs 
of public history statues. The upshot of my analysis is that recontextualization, a solution 
that has been presented as satisfying both preservationists and removalists, does not 
actually do so. It fails as a compromise because, once public history statues are understood 
as public history, recontextualization dissolves into either removal or preservation.  
 
5. The Value of Public History 
 
I turn now to a further explanatory benefit of understanding public history statues in terms 
of their role in shaping public identity. Specifically, understanding public history statues in 
terms of their role in shaping public identity helps make sense of the importance of public 
history statues. This entails understanding why conflicts over public history statues are so 
passionate, why there was a wave of statue toppling during the 2020 protests against police 




If public history statues shape public identity then conflicts over public history statues are, 
at least in part, conflicts over the public’s identity. These may be conflicts over what that 
identity is, but may also be over who has power to determine what that identity is. 
Identities are not only valuable to people for how they define themselves, but, as I have 
argued, they also play an important role in establishing who matters. So in a nation-state 
where Canadians are taken to have political entitlements that non-Canadians do not, the 
boundaries of ‘Canadian’ are important. Public history of this sort is particularly poignant in 
settler-states like Canada, where there are centuries-old contested land claims. As Thomas 
King (2013) notes, historical claims are used to establish settler colonial claims to the land. If 
‘Canada’ begins with Macdonald, if its boundaries are defined by the many “firsts” of 
Scottish-descended settlers, and if it claims geographical territory as its own, then that 
Canada-defining history is a necessary part of the claim to that land. Consequently, 
establishing Indigenous nations’ claims on the land requires challenging Canadian history, 
and challenging public history may threaten state claims on the land. A similar 
argumentative pattern may be applied to membership in and service by institutions. If 
Canadian institutions are meant to serve Canadians, then who counts as ‘Canadian’ is 
important. Contests over public history, then, are related to questions concerning who is 
entitled to membership in, and to be served by, Canadian institutions. Since many historical 
wrongs — from colonialism and slavery to segregation and assimilation — involve this sort 
of wrongful exclusion from moral and political membership, public history is a natural 




This account of the value placed upon public history statues helps make sense of the string 
of statue topplings in the middle of 2020 during the protests against police violence and 
state racism which began in the United States. The protest wave began in Wisconsin with 
the police shooting of Jacob Blake and took as its subject both other instances of police 
violence against citizens as well as broader patterns of state racism such as municipalities 
overfunding police forces at the expense of social services. In the midst of these protests 
there were a series of topplings of racist statues, beginning with the Edward Colston statue 
in Bristol, England, and continuing with a number of American statues representing 
Confederate and colonial figures. Such that the protests were against police violence they 
were, in part, about the exclusion of Black Americans from moral and political membership 
in civil society. That they are the disproportionate targets of not just police violence but 
policing in general suggests an unjust exclusion from the category of people who the state is 
supposed to serve. Such that the police are used to control public space, the protests were 
also a contest over that public space.14 
 
Such that the protests were over control of the public and who belongs to the category of 
people who the state is supposed to serve, public history statues are understandable 
targets. As I have argued, public history statues shape public identities and can shape unjust 
identities. The identities are unjust such that they wrongfully exclude people from or 
marginalize them within identity categories, and this exclusion or marginalization results in 
people facing wrongful constraints. Statues like those of American Confederate figures or 
Christopher Columbus help shape conceptions of the public that exclude or marginalize 
 
14 Two instructive examples here are the establishment of police-free autonomous zones in Seattle and 
Wisconsin as well as the Seattle police department’s decision to use teargas immediately after the mayor had 
announced a ban on the weapon. Both examples speak to a contest over who has control over whom.  
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Black and Indigenous people and other people of colour, and it was those statues that were 
targeted. The protests also concerned control of the public. Toppling the statues, from this 
perspective, may be viewed as a contest over who gets to define the public. So the 
protesters were not just protesting the content of the public history, but the right to create 
public history and thereby define the public themselves.15  
 
During the protests, David Olusoga wrote an editorial in the British Guardian that the 
statues should not become a distraction. My account of statues as public history also makes 
sense of this sentiment. The statues are important such that they contribute to defining the 
public and defining who matters. However, the statues are ultimately not themselves the 
political systems that ultimately operate and manage the public. A just public history will 
not, for example, directly constrain police violence, return stolen land, or otherwise undo 
material inequality. Focusing exclusively on public history statues and other political 
symbols risks merely changing the story the unjust order uses to legitimate itself without 
changing the actual order. Understanding the limits of public history this way helps clarify 
the virtue of what Burch-Brown and Nathaniel Coleman describe as the “reclaiming” 
approach to bad public history (Burch-Brown forthcoming: 12). They suggest that more 
important than any one approach to what is done with statues is reclaiming the territory 
around the statue. I understand this as prioritizing the sorts of changes that allow people to 
create justice around the statue, and any approach that achieves justice is to be preferred. 
 
 
15 Control over public history is not always so confrontational. In Glasgow there is the practice of putting a 
traffic cone on the head of the Duke of Wellington statue. The coning itself is not a grand political statement, 
but when the city council tried to change the statue to inhibit coning there was a successful mobilization 




In this paper, I have argued for understanding public history statues primarily as works of 
history. History helps shape identities, and so public history statues help shape public 
identities. These identities can be shaped so as to exclude or marginalize people and 
thereby burden them with unjust constraints. Centring public history’s identity-shaping role 
undercuts recontextualization as a response to bad public history statues: either 
interventions stop the statue from shaping identity in the way that it is, in which case 
recontextualization reduces to removalism, or the statue is able to continue sustaining the 
identity it has helped shape, in which case recontextualization reduces to preservation. 
Public history’s identity-shaping role also makes sense of the importance given to 
confrontations over bad public history statues. Altogether, public history statues are an 
important part of how a society understands itself. By focusing on how these statues do not 
just reflect identity but work to shape it, the discourse surrounding public history becomes 
at once simpler and more complicated. The discourse is simplified because it is clarified: 
what is at issue is how the people are to be understood and who is to be valued. However, 
this simpler question is unforgiving, thus the complication. There is ultimately no 
compromise available between removalism and preservationism. Either public history is left 
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